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Ethiopian B737 MAX 8 Crashes On Departure

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Zak (netAirspace FAA) 15 Mar 19, 21:19Post
6 months? Ouch!
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)

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ANCFlyer (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 16 Mar 19, 09:25Post
airtrainer wrote:
Boeing 737 Max Planes Could Take Six Months to Fix, Cost More Than $500 Million, Analysts Say
Boeing could need between three and six months to fix and install new software on its 737 Max aircraft

So what I'm reading here is that if you've got travel planned on a 737 w/WN or AA in the US you better keep checking. I'm three weeks out from ORD-MCO-ORD, but in indication of airframe in the res other than 738 (I hope it's not a Max not because of the current issue but because AA has dumbed down their F cabin to 38 inch pitch in F, FFS).

Serious questions.

$500M impact on who? Boeing, Airlines, both combined? Separate?

Aircraft availability will be impaired obviously. To what extent. Since I'm not a scheduler - only a pax - can I make an educated guess as to whether my ride will be CXLd because no bird is available to make the lift?

Who decides what gets cancelled that day/week?
Armor. M60A1, M60A3, M1, M1A1, Master Gunner, CSM - Best Job I Ever Had
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 17 Mar 19, 18:04Post
ANCFlyer wrote:
airtrainer wrote:
Boeing 737 Max Planes Could Take Six Months to Fix, Cost More Than $500 Million, Analysts Say
Boeing could need between three and six months to fix and install new software on its 737 Max aircraft

So what I'm reading here is that if you've got travel planned on a 737 w/WN or AA in the US you better keep checking. I'm three weeks out from ORD-MCO-ORD, but in indication of airframe in the res other than 738 (I hope it's not a Max not because of the current issue but because AA has dumbed down their F cabin to 38 inch pitch in F, FFS).

Serious questions.

$500M impact on who? Boeing, Airlines, both combined? Separate?

Aircraft availability will be impaired obviously. To what extent. Since I'm not a scheduler - only a pax - can I make an educated guess as to whether my ride will be CXLd because no bird is available to make the lift?

Who decides what gets cancelled that day/week?


I was wondering the same thing. There's still a lot of speculation (which is fun; that's why this thread has so many comments), and the $500M figure seems to be a rather inchoate bit of that. DXing probably knows the scheduling answers.

Anyway, some more choice spec quotes. I don't know what happened to the plane, and while I suspect it has a gremlin (see Bugs Bunny in "The Falling Hare"), I think what will be most interesting is seeing how this all relates to the Swiss cheese model of accident causation. There are a lot of holes.

Quote:

Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.

The safety analysis:

-Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.

-Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.

-Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.


In this atmosphere, the System Safety Analysis on MCAS, just one piece of the mountain of documents needed for certification, was delegated to Boeing.
[...]

„The higher limit meant that each time MCAS was triggered, it caused a much greater movement of the tail than was specified in that original safety analysis document.

[...]
None of the engineers were aware of a higher limit, said a second current FAA engineer.

[...]
Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight controls engineer who is now an avionics and satellite-communications consultant, said that because MCAS reset each time it was used, it effectively has unlimited authority.





As Click has noted, this whole event may be panic with no basis in fact, and instead the human mind's ability to perceive patterns, even if they don't truly exist.

On the other hand, could be Gremlins.
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 17 Mar 19, 18:37Post
Based on all we know about the MCAS system and the way it was implemented and documented, it is hard to argue that this was a tremendously negligent approach.

But - and that's a big but: from all I read, the easiest way to make MCAS shut up is to disconnect AP/AT and fly manually.

I read on different sources that the LionAir crew of the last flight before the fatal one did exactly that. They knew the AoA sensor was faulty, and that this could lead to MCAS problems, so they flew manually.

The Ethiopian crew had been trained on how to override MCAS after the LionAir crash.

Did both crews still make the same mistake of battling an automated system that was running berserk, and forgot to fly the aircraft while doing so? Did that mistake lead to almost identical crash patterns?

The experience of the ET f/o and the general safety record of JT aside, but that does not sound very likely to me. I think there will be another contributing factor here.


Btw, I still don't know if the MCAS is fed by 1 or 2 AoA sensors. I had the chance to speak to a 737 pilot yesterday, though he flies NG only, not MAX. He said that both AoA readings were used to calculate the data for MCAS, but indeed only 1 sensor was connected to the system. When I asked him what that meant in practice, he had to admit he didn't know. Same for the question what MCAS does in case both AoA sensors deliver different readings, as it happened on the LionAir flight.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 18 Mar 19, 01:34Post
I exchanged a few more messages with that 737 captain. I don't know why I thought the MCAS was not active when the autopilot was disengaged. The opposite is true. For the MCAS to activate, the autopilot needs to be disengaged and the flaps need to be retracted and the AoA needs to exceed a certain limit and the airspeed needs to fall below a certain treshold.

Also, I finally understood the sensor logic (I hope). Boeing has 2 separate flight control computers (FCC) that are being fed data from independent sensors. Both FCC are calculating data for the MCAS, but only the active one will adjust the trim when MCAS activates.

But here's the problem: when you only have 2 independent systems that are supposed to show the same data, but don't - how do you determine which one is correct?

It seems that in both cases, the MCAS activated itself when it shouldn't have. And while it is possible to override MCAS by manually trimming the aircraft, you have to repeat that every 5 seconds. Because 5 seconds after being overruled by the pilot, MCAS will activate itself again.

Unless you trigger the kill switch. Which Boeing decided not to mention in the documentation, in order not to confuse pilots. Still, at least the ET crew should have known how to deactivate MCAS, or at least disconnect it from the stab trim.

ANCFlyer wrote:$500M impact on who? Boeing, Airlines, both combined? Separate?

WN has 175 seats in a B38M. Assuming they fly 4 legs a day, average load factor 85%, average ticket price $70.

That's 175 * 4 * 0.85 * 70 = (rounded down) $40,000 revenue with a MAX 8 per day.

381 units have been delivered so far. That's (again rounded down) $15M a day. 180 days * $15M = $2.7bln.

Now that's revenue, not profit. Still, the airlines will have a lot of related costs that will keep incurring (financing, crew, maintenance facilities etc.), plus some extra costs resulting from the grounding (wet leases, schedule adjustments, customer service etc.).

My guess is, if we are really talking about 6 months, then $500M won't cut it. The damage will be with the airlines, but they will most certainly seek compensation from Boeing.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
airtrainer 18 Mar 19, 01:58Post
Boeing has halted deliveries of Boeing 737 Max in response to the global grounding of the aircraft, the company says.
"Boeing has paused delivery of 737 Max airplanes due to the temporary grounding," says Boeing in a statement. "We continue to build 737 Max airplanes, while assessing how the situation, including potential capacity constraints, will impact our production system."

Source : https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ng-456666/
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Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 18 Mar 19, 02:10Post
On Mar 17th 2019 the Ethiopian Transport Minister said:

"Recently, the FDR and CVR of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 have been successfully read out. Our experts and US experts have verified the accuracy of the information. The Ethiopian government accepted the information, and the cause of the crash is similar to the Indonesian Flight 610. A preliminary reported will be published in a month with a detailed analysis. We are grateful to the French Government for its ongoing support."


Per Av Herald. http://avherald.com/h?article=4c534c4a&opt=0
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 18 Mar 19, 02:25Post
airtrainer wrote:
Boeing has halted deliveries of Boeing 737 Max in response to the global grounding of the aircraft, the company says.
"Boeing has paused delivery of 737 Max airplanes due to the temporary grounding," says Boeing in a statement. "We continue to build 737 Max airplanes, while assessing how the situation, including potential capacity constraints, will impact our production system."

Source : https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ng-456666/


So if the Swiss cheese on this one is like the previous one, what type of fix action will be accepted, and how quickly can it be implemented?
DXing 18 Mar 19, 07:09Post
ANCFlyer wrote:So what I'm reading here is that if you've got travel planned on a 737 w/WN or AA in the US you better keep checking. I'm three weeks out from ORD-MCO-ORD, but in indication of airframe in the res other than 738 (I hope it's not a Max not because of the current issue but because AA has dumbed down their F cabin to 38 inch pitch in F, FFS).

Serious questions.

$500M impact on who? Boeing, Airlines, both combined? Separate?

Aircraft availability will be impaired obviously. To what extent. Since I'm not a scheduler - only a pax - can I make an educated guess as to whether my ride will be CXLd because no bird is available to make the lift?

Who decides what gets cancelled that day/week?


Lucas wrote:I was wondering the same thing. There's still a lot of speculation (which is fun; that's why this thread has so many comments), and the $500M figure seems to be a rather inchoate bit of that. DXing probably knows the scheduling answers.


Operation Managers and forward MX schedulers will make the decisions but since the flight is so far out(more than 72 hours) I doubt anything will be cancelled. Plenty of time to build up work arounds. If I understand correctly it's on AA. Some flying will be subbed out to the regional.

Zak wrote:Also, I finally understood the sensor logic (I hope). Boeing has 2 separate flight control computers (FCC) that are being fed data from independent sensors. Both FCC are calculating data for the MCAS, but only the active one will adjust the trim when MCAS activates.

But here's the problem: when you only have 2 independent systems that are supposed to show the same data, but don't - how do you determine which one is correct?


You don't see "both". You only see one. If the primary faults, the other takes over with an associated EICAS message.

Zak wrote:It seems that in both cases, the MCAS activated itself when it shouldn't have. And while it is possible to override MCAS by manually trimming the aircraft, you have to repeat that every 5 seconds. Because 5 seconds after being overruled by the pilot, MCAS will activate itself again.

Unless you trigger the kill switch. Which Boeing decided not to mention in the documentation, in order not to confuse pilots. Still, at least the ET crew should have known how to deactivate MCAS, or at least disconnect it from the stab trim.


Any discrepancy in the automated trim is cause to deactivate the auto trim. The crew of the flight just prior to the Indonesian crash flight followed the checklist and did that, problem solved. It was in the write up they submitted to MX and which the crew involved in the crash should have had access to. The ET crew should have done the same thing if they followed the checklist. My guess there is that the low time FO was so far behind the power curve from the start of the malfunction he was unable to be of much assistance to the Captain, who although he had 7000 total hours, probably had very few in this specific type.

Zak wrote:Still, the airlines will have a lot of related costs that will keep incurring (financing, crew, maintenance facilities etc.), plus some extra costs resulting from the grounding (wet leases, schedule adjustments, customer service etc.).


The financing yes, the crew, maintenance facilities etc. no. The crews will still fly, just something else. The MX facilities will still work, just on something else. There will be additional cost for parking wherever the plane landed after the grounding was issued since wherever they landed is where they sit today.
What's the point of an open door policy if inside the open door sits a closed mind?
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 18 Mar 19, 09:34Post
Here is a painful read: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/

The FAA outsourced parts of the certification job to... Boeing.
As Boeing hustled in 2015 to catch up to Airbus and certify its new 737 MAX, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed the agency’s safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself, and to speedily approve the resulting analysis.

But the original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA for a new flight control system on the MAX — a report used to certify the plane as safe to fly — had several crucial flaws.

It's only a press article. But one that doesn't sound good for Boeing at all.

DXing wrote:You don't see "both". You only see one. If the primary faults, the other takes over with an associated EICAS message.

Sorry, "you" in that case didn't refer to the pilot, but to the computer. How can the primary decide it is faulting, when there is only 1 other reference. It might as well be the backup system that's running on faulty data.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 18 Mar 19, 20:02Post
Zak wrote:It's only a press article. But one that doesn't sound good for Boeing at all.

And from the Seattle Times, at that. Looks like a good read, I'll have to dig into it properly.

Norwegian Air hasn’t had an awful lot of luck lately. The airline operates a fleet of Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. As such, there have been a number of problems with Boeing aircraft as of late which have seen their aircraft stuck on the ground.

https://simpleflying.com/norwegian-non- ... ng-issues/
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 18 Mar 19, 22:15Post
ShanwickOceanic wrote:Looks like a good read, I'll have to dig into it properly.

It is a good read. I just finished reading it entirely. And I have to admit, the article left me angry. Angry in the same way I felt after the final conclusion what had brought AF447 down.

In essence, Boeing introduced a new system (MCAS), downplayed and lied to the FAA about its possible impact on the flight performance in order not to have to add more redundancy, and then successfully pushed the FAA into allowing them to rubber-stamp their own design.

Because the FAA documentation read that the MCAS had a maximum authority of 0.6°. During flight testing, that limit was silently raised to 2.5°. And as the MCAS can trigger again every 5 seconds after the pilot fought against it manually, and then gets another 2.5° to play with regardless how far the pilot had re-trimmed the aircraft in the meantime, the MCAS can push the stab to its physical limit in no more than 2 trigger cycles.

All depending on the reading of 1 single sensor.

And then Boeing decided not mention MCAS in the documentation at all, so that they can tell the airlines that all NG pilots needed was to watch a short Powerpoint on an iPad to be fit for the MAX.

Both Boeing and the FAA knew that the certification of the MAX did not go down as planned. Then the JT crash came, and all they did was tell the airlines "oh yeah, there's a thing called MCAS, and we may have to provide a software update for it in a couple of months".

Then the ET crash came, and they still hesitated for a few days before finally grounding the type.

Seriously, what the hell? {mad}
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
airtrainer 20 Mar 19, 11:12Post
The pressure on Boeing continues to grow following two crashes of its 737 MAX 8 aircraft. French aviation experts have now confirmed that there are strong similarities of the data collected from the black boxes of the crashed Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX and the Lion Air 737 MAX that had been lost in October 2018.
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 had crashed on March 12 after takeoff from Addis Ababa airport, killing all 157 souls onboard. Lion Air flight 610 had also crashed shortly after takeoff from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia killing 189. Both aircraft failed to gain altitude after taking off and show similar flight paths in which the nose of the airplane dipped down repeatedly before pilots lost the fight to keep the aircraft climbing.

Link
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Zak (netAirspace FAA) 20 Mar 19, 11:43Post
Transport Canada and EASA announced that they will no longer rely on FAA certifications for aircraft, but will conduct their own certification processes.

The DOT already launched an investigation about Boeing and the FAA, regarding the 737 MAX and specifically the MCAS certification.

Now, the DOJ followed suit and launched a criminal investigation against Boeing. In this context, this is an unprecedented occurence.

The next question is if foreign authorities will only conduct own reviews on the updates Boeing will provide for the MAX, or if they will require to re-certify the entire type. If the latter happens (and the rumours can be heard already), the 737 MAX may remain grounded beyond 2019, at least outside the US.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
miamiair (netAirspace FAA) 20 Mar 19, 12:08Post
Zak wrote:Transport Canada and EASA announced that they will no longer rely on FAA certifications for aircraft, but will conduct their own certification processes.


Whoa. Does that mean the EASA bilateral agreements went out the window? Good luck getting anything else certified.
And let's get one thing straight. There's a big difference between a pilot and an aviator. One is a technician; the other is an artist in love with flight. — E. B. Jeppesen
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 20 Mar 19, 14:13Post
I guess the bilateral agreements did not cover the FAA allowing Boeing to rubber-stamp their own design.

So far, Transport Canada and EASA only referred to the software update and design changes for the MAX that Boeing is supposed to deliver. If they will extend that to the entire MAX certification, or even other types, will probably depend on what DOT and DOJ will find out during their investigations.

Personally, I cannot see it coming to this. I doubt that EASA has the capacities to conduct a full certification just like that.

And while some may presume that the EASA wants to boost Airbus with such a move, I strongly doubt that. Airbus does not benefit from the MAX grounding. They cannot get even nearly enough NEOs finished themselves. Their order books are full for years to come. Any airline that would not cancel their MAX orders and switch to the NEO would have to wait for at least 7 years to get their aircraft delivered. No one will do that.

Maybe a few still-to-be-placed future orders will switch from Boeing to Airbus as a result of this, but I doubt this effect will be measurable. The biggest problem for Boeing will be that a few cash-strapped airlines that were too optimistic with their orders (Vietjet, Norwegian, FlyDubai, Jet Airways, to just name a few) may use the opportunity to cancel orders.

But again, that doesn't help Airbus, and I even doubt it hurts Boeing. Orders for airframes that airlines couldn't have supported financially would sooner or later have led to an increasing number of second-hand airframes on the market. I doubt that in 10 year down the road, the total number of produced MAX airframes would be any different, regardless of whether e.g. VietJet cancelled or honored their order of 200 airframes now.

So no, this is not about protecting national interests. This is about the world's leading plane maker and their local aviation authority flushing established procedures down the toilet in order to rush a new model's market release.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
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Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 15:11Post
Not that I'm convinced that this type of stupidity doesn't go on anywhere that there's lots of money, but I get it. "Your 737 MAX was good enough to kill a few hundred, so how's this new 777 you've been tinkering with?"

Unfortunately Boeing really screwed the pooch on this one.
Click Click D'oh (Photo Quality Screener & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 16:42Post
Lucas wrote:Unfortunately Boeing really screwed the pooch on this one.


Did they?

For the sake or argument, let's assume that both planes did crash because of MCAS. Well, first off, neither plane crashed because MCAS. MCAS points the nose down, but is easily corrected for as seen in the porpoising flight of both jets. Something eventually put the jets in the ground, be it either something physically breaking on the jets or the crew being distracted trying to remedy the fault and losing track of the jet.

Second, that would mean both aircraft were dispatched with faulty AoA sensors.

Third, that would mean both crews had serious training issues. Before everyone jumps in with "Boeing didn't document it!" that's not entirely correct. Boeing didn't document the specifics of MCAS, BUT every Boeing flight manual since the 727 has had the procedure to deal with a runaway stabilizer, which is exactly what erroneous MCAS activation would look like to the pilots, and exactly how it should be corrected. That proper corrective action by a different pilot is what saved the exact same Lion Air plane the day before. Did Boeing screw up by not writing a specific section for both Stab runaway and MCAS failure? Would a pilot really know the difference in the time it takes to perform the corrective action?

The important questions in my mind, if they were both MCAS events are:
1) Why were both jets dispatched with bad AoA sensors
2) Why did neither crew deactivate the electrically driven Stab systems?
3) Why did the jets eventually crash?
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Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 17:06Post
Click Click D'oh wrote:
Lucas wrote:Unfortunately Boeing really screwed the pooch on this one.


Did they?



Yes. If they hadn't, we wouldn't see worldwide annoyance with the entire Max boondoggle.

Whether it's really deserved is beside the point by now, I think. The Swiss cheese model for screwing the pooch lined up all the holes, as Zak and others have pointed out.

Oh well. Learn from it and move on.
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 17:08Post
PS-I appreciate the technical considerations in your post, but in the business side, that's not what's necessarily being operated on.
Click Click D'oh (Photo Quality Screener & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 18:16Post
Lucas wrote:Yes. If they hadn't, we wouldn't see worldwide annoyance with the entire Max boondoggle.


Worldwide annoyance brought to you by the same humanity that allowed Worldwide fame for Honey Boo Boo. So, grains of salt required in regards to their annoyance.

What happens if the answers to my prior questions in reality are:
1) Lion Air really is a shitty airline with a terrible safety record
2) A 200 hour co-pilot got overwhelmed and behind his jet.

I mean, we shouldn't be conducting air accident investigations based on internet outrage should we?
We sleep peacefully in our beds at night because rough men stand ready to do violence on our behalf
Zak (netAirspace FAA) 20 Mar 19, 18:26Post
Click Click D'oh wrote:Did they?

If there is no suspicion they might have, then why did both the DOT and DOJ start investigations? A criminal investigation, in case of the DOJ. And not against the airline. Against Boeing.

As with most crashes, there most probably won't be a singular cause, but a combination of causes. MCAS being one of them, but not the only one.

As for the question why the crews did not apply stab trim runaway procedures - from what I heard, the typical sign of a stab trim runaway is a continuous trim shift (in lack of a better term). However, MCAS did not cause a continuous trim change, but repeated singular steps. That may have contributed to crews not identifying the situation as a stab trim runaway.

The crews are still not off the hook. In the JT crash, while no MCAS documentation was available at that time, the crew on the previous flight battled with the same problem and did disconnect the auto trim. Why the crew on the following flight did not do the same remains a valid question.

As does the question why the aircraft was allowed to keep operating at all. Though JT did seem to exchange the faulty AoA sensor 2 days earlier, which raises the question why AoA sensors would fail so frequently on the MAX.

As for the ET crew, since they had been retrained after the JT crash, it does raise questions why they had been unable to identify the MCAS problem.

However - "the crews should have fought the aircraft harder" is not a valid excuse when you introduce a new system, change the specs without telling the licensing body, don't tell your customers about the system at all, and even remain inactive after the system obviously did play a role in a fatal crash a few months after the type was launched.

That - assuming it did happen like that, and all signs point towards it - reeks of criminal negligence. Which is quite probably the reason why the DOJ launched a criminal investigation.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)
Lucas (netAirspace ATC & Founding Member) 20 Mar 19, 20:07Post
Click Click D'oh wrote:
Lucas wrote:Yes. If they hadn't, we wouldn't see worldwide annoyance with the entire Max boondoggle.


Worldwide annoyance brought to you by the same humanity that allowed Worldwide fame for Honey Boo Boo. So, grains of salt required in regards to their annoyance.

What happens if the answers to my prior questions in reality are:
1) Lion Air really is a shitty airline with a terrible safety record
2) A 200 hour co-pilot got overwhelmed and behind his jet.

I mean, we shouldn't be conducting air accident investigations based on internet outrage should we?


I don't think that our sense of justice can really put the cat back in the bag. I mean I agree with you that the Swiss cheese has unneeded holes, and that we don't even have anything concrete, but hey, the results are already rolling in the Boeing and the FAA.
AC-tech123 21 Mar 19, 04:07Post
I have been an Aircraft Maintenance Technician for 35 Yrs, About the 737 Max8, because of the size of the new engines, they had to be mounted higher and forward of the wing. Now can anyone tell me how that would make the nose of the A/C to raise it, when you put a weigh fwd it makes the nose go down, I know this because every time I step on the scale the weight has to go fwd to lower the bar! Maybe the extra thrust causes it, I think they are adding to many extra sections of fuselage behind the Wing.
ShanwickOceanic (netAirspace FAA) 21 Mar 19, 09:17Post
Now the knives are out, a sacrificial lamb has been found:

The Pentagon has launched an inquiry into acting US Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan for alleged favouritism to his ex-employer, Boeing.

The Defence Department's inspector general will look into the matter following a complaint from a watchdog group.

Mr Shanahan is accused of frequently praising Boeing in meetings about government contracts and acquisitions.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47647865
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.

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