krowyz wrote:Another horrible mishap with enormous toll in human lives. Designers and rulemakers cannot afford not learning with its lessons. There's always room (and motivation) to increase crash survivability - in the present case, the fuel tank protection versus the LG failure is candidate to a careful review. Perhaps, the current approach (par. 25.721) can be improved.
We saw in the case of BA38 how that should
work. Whether the SSJ is deficient in this regard, or whether they just smacked it in a lot harder and nothing else would have survived either, is an interesting question.
paul mcallister wrote:When I say keep the overhead lockers locked,I mean in the case of an emergency,and as a standard practise during final approach,until the aircraft has shut down on stand.
What would such a system weigh, though, and can that cost be justified?
Personally, I think examples need to be made. We've seen this go on for far too long and, until now, we've been lucky. I would like to see manslaughter charges stick in this case, but I've no doubt they were "distressed" and "not thinking straight"
I'd also like to see the likes of EU, US, etc., agreeing a zero-tolerance approach to future "cases" (see what I did there?). If you come down the slides in a future evacuation and you're clutching a bag, camera, whatever, you get fined based on its weight and dimensions. No questions asked. Yes yes, you can have a blanket in a moment, just come over to the fire truck first and swipe your MasterCard. Or climb back up the slide and put the bag back, your choice. Yes, we told you about the fines in the safety brief. Oh, you weren't listening? Excellent, that's another $1000...
Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast:
For it is the number of a man; and its number is One hundred threescore and twelve.